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Cryptographic architectures provide different security properties to sensitive usage mod-
els. However, unless reliability of architectures is guaranteed, such security properties
can be undermined through natural or malicious faults. In this thesis, two underlying
block ciphers which can be used in authenticated encryption algorithms are considered,
i.e., LED and HIGHT block ciphers. The former is of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) type and has been considered areaefficient, while the latter constitutes a Feistel
network structure and is suitable for low-complexity and low-power embedded security
applications. In this thesis, we propose efficient error detection architectures including
variants of recomputing with encoded operands and signature-based schemes to detect
both transient and permanent faults. Authenticated encryption is applied in cryptogra-
phy to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity simultaneously to the message
sent in a communication channel. In this thesis, we show that the proposed schemes are
applicable to the case study of Simple Lightweight CFB (SILC) for providing authen-
ticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). The error simulations are performed
using Xilinx ISE tool and the results are benchmarked for the Xilinx FPGA family Virtex-
7 to assess the reliability capability and efficiency of the proposed architectures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
To provide different security properties efficiently, lightweight cryptographic implemen-
tations on different hardware platforms have been emerged due to the advancement of
constrained devices. These nodes require low-complexity implementations over small chip
area and consume low amount of energy. Nevertheless, the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES), the current symmetric-key cryptography standard, may not achieve such
tight necessities in terms of performance and implementation metrics. Thus, lightweight
security mechanisms through low-complexity implementations of cryptographic algo-
rithms are needed. We note that there have been constant, prominent efforts to realize
the AES lightweight, an example for which is a 128-bit AES that was developed over
an area of 2,400 gate equivalent [1]. It is noted that the AES architecture in [1] has
been towards considerable area reductions; nonetheless, it is still considered a burden
for resource-constrained applications such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags,
nano-sensor nodes, and applications such as implantable and wearable medical devices.
Furthermore, the inability of the AES to adapt to the varying level of security needed by
different devices might be inefficient in case lower number of bits need to be protected.
In recent years and based on the above motivation, a number of lightweight block ci-
phers have been proposed, e.g., KATAN and KTANTAN [2], PICCOLO [3], and PRESENT
[4], SEA [5], LED [6], Simon and Speck [7–10], Midori [11], HIGHT [12], and the like.
Based on such ciphers, an open competition for a new Authenticated Encryption algo-
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rithm (CAESAR) [13] has been initiated and will identify a portfolio of authenticated
ciphers that offer advantages over AES-Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and are suitable for
widespread adoption. These algorithms, e.g., SILC: SImple Lightweight CFB [14] that
employs authenticated encryption with associated data, use encryption/decryption blocks
as underlying structures in which the aforementioned block ciphers can be used. Authen-
ticated Encryption provides authenticity and privacy to the data by first converting the
plaintext to ciphertext and an authentication tag, message authentication code (MAC).
Some of the authenticated encryption candidates such as SILC is of Encrypt-then-MAC
type. In the Encrypt-then-MAC type, the authentication tag or MAC is created based on
the resulting ciphertext. The MAC is provided as an input to the decryption algorithm
and it is compared with the actual tag produced in the decryption. If both of the tags do
not match, then authentication fails and if they match, then the output of the decryption
algorithm will be the original plaintext.
It is imperative to note that although cryptographic algorithms, e.g., authenticated
encryption which preserves authenticity and confidentiality of the message sent by the
sender, provide different security mechanisms, natural and malicious faults can undermine
such purpose. Let us go over different fault models we have considered in this thesis. We
consider both single and multiple stuck-at faults because both are relevant with respect
to intentional and natural faults, i.e., fault attackers prefer to ideally be able to inject
single faults but, in reality, due to lack of technological advancements, multiple faults
might occur, whose protection mechanisms are required. Moreover, natural faults can be
of single nature, e.g., single event upsets, or multiple defects. Furthermore, we consider
both transient and permanent faults. The attackers typically inject transient faults to
gain as much information as they desire without breaking the cryptosystems; however,
natural defects could be of permanent nature; thus, we consider them as well.
Various types of fault injection mechanisms such as temperature attacks, optical at-
tacks, electromagnetic fault injection, and the respective countermeasures to such attacks
are presented to date. Concurrent error detection (CED) techniques have been widely
used to architect reliable hardware for the cryptographic algorithms [15–23] (including
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a number of schemes, e.g., hardware/information/time/hybrid redundancy). Hardware
redundancy makes use of extra hardware to process the same input twice to match the
two outputs. Information redundancy schemes have a number of variants, e.g., robust
codes [24]. Time redundancy technique has a number of schemes, e.g., recomputing with
shifted operands (RESO) [25, 26], recomputing with rotated operands (RERO) [27], and
recomputing with permuted operands (REPO) [28]. The hybrid redundancy scheme is
given in [29–31] where different improvements in the architecture have been proposed.
In this thesis, we consider two block ciphers which can be used as part of SILC,
i.e., light encryption device (LED) [6], an AES-based block cipher and high security
and lightweight (HIGHT) [12]. LED has 64-bit block length and uses 64-bit key length
and re-uses the S-box of PRESENT block cipher [4]. HIGHT is of generalized Feistel
type network and has 64-bit block length and 128-bit key length. HIGHT is suitable for
embedded CPUs that are used in the nano-sensor network systems. SILC uses a combi-
nation of both cipher feedback (CFB) and cipher block chaining (CBC) for encryption
and decryption.
In this thesis, we propose error detection approaches for block ciphers LED and
HIGHT, considering the reliability and performance metrics objectives. Signature-based
approaches are used in conjunction with the proposed error detection schemes based on
recomputing with encoded operands to achieve high efficiency, while maintaining high
error coverage.
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1.1 Thesis Outline
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 2: This chapter explains the block ciphers LED and HIGHT.
• Chapter 3: In this chapter, we present the proposed hardware and time redundant
error detection approaches for LED and HIGHT block ciphers.
• Chapter 4: The fault model used for testing the proposed designs is discussed in
this chapter. The chapter also presents the error coverage results of both hardware
and time redundant error detection schemes.
• Chapter 5: The FPGA benchmarks for Xilinx Virtex-7 for the proposed archi-
tectures is discussed in this chapter.
• Chapter 6: Conclusions and possible future work are presented in this chapter.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we briefly explain the block ciphers LED and HIGHT. Then, in the next
chapter, the proposed error detection approaches are presented.
2.1 LED Block Cipher
LED is a 64-bit block cipher. It is of the AES type and is a substitution permutation
network (SPN). LED has a nonce length lN of 8 bytes and tag length τ . It re-uses S-box
of PRESENT block cipher and has a 64-bit key (LED block cipher can be used as one of
the underlying block ciphers EK for SILC, as a usage model). The input plaintext which
is of 64-bit length is arranged in a 4 × 4 array matrix called cipher state matrix. The
cipher state matrix of the LED block cipher along with the key matrix are governed by
an irreducible polynomial in GF (24). The implemented LED block cipher uses a 64-bit
key. Both the cipher state matrix and the key are arranged in 4×4 matrix in the form of
16 four-bit nibbles. Each entity in the cipher state matrix and the key matrix is of 4-bit
length.
The first operation is the addition of round key denoted by addRoundKey(state, Ki).
This operation is performed on cipher state matrix and key matrix Ki. LED block cipher
has a second operation called step function, that is responsible for providing enhanced
security. This operation comprises of four iterative rounds for encryption in a sequential
manner. In LED, each round consists of sequential set of four operations. For the 64-
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bit key array matrix, addRoundKey and step operations are repeated for eight times.
The LED cipher has 32 rounds of iteration for encrypting the plaintext. The sequence of
operations that are carried out on the output of the first step are AddConstants, SubCells,
ShiftRow and MixColumnsSerial, more details are presented in the next chapter.
2.2 HIGHT Block Cipher
HIGHT is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key length proposed. HIGHT is a variant of
Feistel network and it has 32 iterative rounds to complete the encryption process. It has
64-bit plaintext and 128-bit master key as its inputs and a 64-bit ciphertext as its output.
It has been claimed that the hardware implementation of HIGHT is more efficient than
the AES by justifying that, it had consumed 3,048 gates in 0.25µm technology.
The plaintext input is represented by P = P7||.....P1||P0, where P0...P7 are each of
eight bits length, and ′||′ denotes concatenation operation and the plaintext P is of 64 bits
length. For each round i = 0, ...., 32, the 64-bit intermediate values are represented by
Xi = Xi,7||....Xi,1||Xi,0. The 64-bit ciphertext output is represented as C = C7||....||C1||C0
and the master key which is of 128 bits length is denoted as MK = MK15||...||MK0, more
details are presented in the next chapter when we go over the proposed error detection
schemes.
Chapter 3
Proposed Reliable Architectures for
LED and HIGHT
In this chapter, the error detection schemes used for detecting the transient and perma-
nent faults in the LED and HIGHT block ciphers are presented.
3.1 Motivations
In what follows, we present the motivations in presenting the approaches for error de-
tection of LED and HIGHT block ciphers. Then, in the next sub chapter, the proposed
methods are presented. The CED techniques have been widely used to architect reli-
able hardware for the cryptographic algorithms [15–23] (including diverse schemes, e.g.,
hardware/information/time/hybrid redundancy). Let us review and analyze the existing
fault diagnosis schemes here. The use of variants of parity for error detection is effective;
nevertheless, one needs to utilize/tailor such approaches so that they are flexibly used,
depending on the error detection capability requirements and overhead tolerance (we have
proposed such flexibility when applicable in this thesis). Non-uniform error detection due
to using parity can be alleviated using robust codes at the expense of relatively higher
overhead. If the high area/power overhead is the burden to the usage model, one can
alleviate that through the time redundancy approaches, deteriorating the performance
metrics. We have considered in this thesis variants of time redundancy mechanisms which
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can detect both permanent and transient faults.
The high overhead of hardware redundancy (area/delay overhead of duplication is
roughly 100%), the high delay overhead and inability to detect permanent faults of con-
ventional time redundancy (which is usually the case for hardware failures), the need for
flexibility in terms of overhead and reliability compromise for information redundancy,
and the need for appropriate choice for the specific techniques within hybrid redundancy
pool have been motivations for the proposed work.
This is the first work presenting efficient error detection approaches for LED and
HIGHT. We have closely considered two main criteria in choosing such approaches: (i)
applicability of the approaches to the specific algorithms needs to be considered closely;
for instance, while the FPGA realization of the S-boxes through look-up tables is efficient
(which also affects the error detection, as presented in this thesis for LED), one may
choose to realize them on ASIC through logic-gate approaches (which needs realization
of signatures as logic gates instead of storing them in memories), and (ii) the level of
granularity of the check points can be dynamically chosen, which is dependent on the
overhead tolerance and the reliability requirements for such ciphers. In proposing the
error detection techniques here, we have considered both of these. The merit of the
proposed approaches is (a) the proposed algorithms are oblivious of the implementation
platform (unlike some previous works which use specific resources of platforms), (b)
they can be tailored based on the reliability/overhead compromise, e.g., the scheme for
MixColumnsSerial of LED, and (c) they are flexible in terms of overhead of metrics, and
the reliability goals (alternate approaches are proposed to ensure such requirements are
achieved, e.g., the recomputing with encoded operands scheme of HIGHT).
3.2 Error Detection for LED Block Cipher
The overall flow and the top view of the error detection for the LED block cipher
is presented here, followed by the details on the approaches. We have chosen using
signature-based schemes for LED, especially because of the structures of SubCells and
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MixColumnSerial, for which signature-based schemes provide not only flexibility in error
detection but also achieve high error coverage. The overall error detection architecture
is composed of the predicted/actual signatures and their comparisons to derive the error
indication flags (the derived predicted signatures of these four operations are compared
with the actual ones to get the error indication flags).
Table 3.1: (Interleaved) predicted parity of the S-Box for the LED block cipher.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
P̂s[x] (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1)
ˆPs[x] (Int.) (11) (00) (11) (01) (11) (00) (00) (10)
x 8 9 A B C D E F
ˆPs[x] (0) (1) (0) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
ˆPs[x] (Int.) (11) (01) (00) (10) (01) (10) (01) (10)
3.2.1 AddConstants and ShiftRow
In AddConstants operation, the round constant matrix is given by the round constant
matrix of

0 (rc5||rc4||rc3) 0 0
1 (rc2||rc1||rc0) 0 0
2 (rc5||rc4||rc3) 0 0
3 (rc2||rc1||rc0) 0 0

. The round constants are given by six round-specific
bits, i.e., rc0, rc1, rc2, rc3, rc4, rc5. For each round, the value of round constants are made
zero and the values of the six bits are updated before the AddConstants function. This
round constant matrix is bit-wise XORed with the output of the state matrix from the
addRoundKey operation and the value of the state matrix is updated.
The second column of the round constant matrix depends on the round in which the
matrix is used. For instance, in Round 1, the value of the round constants are rc5 =
0, rc4 = 0, rc3 = 0, rc2 = 0 and rc0 = 1. For the proposed signature-based approach, we
can derive the predicted signatures of such a matrix, e.g., the predicted parity of the last
two columns are zero and the one for the second column is also zero. The reason for such
derivation is that (rc5||rc4||rc3) ⊕ (rc2||rc1||rc0) ⊕ (rc5||rc4||rc3) ⊕ (rc2||rc1||rc0) leads
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to always zero value verifying that the predicted parity is zero. For the first column,
modulo-2 adding of the elements to derive the predicted parities also results in zero.
Thus, the predicted parity vector for the round constant matrix is P̂ = [0, 0, 0, 0] (we use
hat notations for predicted signatures). Thus, we can conclude that the derivation of the
predicted parity is free in hardware for the AddConstants step.
Interleaved parity for burst faults: One can also derive the interleaved parities of the
AddConstants step to account for burst faults. Burst faults are adjacent faults that can
affect the output in case of both malicious and natural faults. Let us denote on the
round constant matrix the rows through which we derive two interleaved parities, i.e.,
even/odd rows as

0 (rc5||rc4||rc3) 0 0
1 (rc2||rc1||rc0) 0 0
2 (rc5||rc4||rc3) 0 0
3 (rc2||rc1||rc0) 0 0

. By modulo-2 adding such rows, we derive
the interleaved parity vectors as P̂1 = P̂2 = [2, 0, 0, 0]. The reason for such derivation is
that for the last three columns, the values are canceled once modulo-2 added and for the
first column we have {0}16 + {2}16 = {1}16 + {3}16.
The ShiftRow operation shifts the rows of the resulting state matrix from the SubCells
operation with respect to its row number. If the operation is performed on the first row,
then the first row is shifted to the left by 1 position and likewise for the second row,
the contents of the state matrix are shifted by two positions. For the ShiftRow step,
derivation of the predicted signatures is straightforward, e.g., parity prediction is free in
hardware as rewiring does not change the predictions.
3.2.2 SubCells
The SubCells operation updates the value of the state matrix by replacing the contents
of the state matrix, according to the S-Box. For detecting the errors in S-Box, we devise
a signature-based scheme illustrated through two case studies, i.e., parity prediction and
interleaved (Int.) parity prediction as shown in Table 3.1. In this method, the output
bits of the S-box are XORed (and for the case of interleaved parity, odd and even bits
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are modulo-2 added separately) and the output of the S-box is appended by one bit (two
bits for the interleaved case). For example, if the output is {C}16 which is {1100}2, that
means the predicted parity of is 0 and the interleaved parity pair is 11 (see Table 3.1).
3.2.3 MixColumnsSerial
MixColumnsSerial uses a hardware-friendly matrix known as MDS, that is given by (this
matrix has been changed from the original construction in [32]) M =

4 1 2 2
8 6 5 6
B E A 9
2 2 F B

.
The updated state matrix from the previous operation is multiplied with the M matrix
and the resulting state matrix is updated column-wise.
For presenting our signature-based scheme, let us denote the input and output state
matrices as A =

a0 a1 a2 a3
a4 a5 a6 a7
a8 a9 aa ab




r0 r1 r2 r3
r4 r5 r6 r7
r8 r9 ra rb
rc rd re rf

. Each entity in the input and
output state matrices is a four-bit nibble. In the MixColumnsSerial step, each column
of the output matrix R is the product of the matrix M and the state matrix A. As
a case study, to compute r0, the first element of the resultant matrix R, denoting the
bits of the elements of A as aij for ith bit jth element, we have (using the irreducible
polynomial utilized for reductions, and not presenting the details for the sake of brevity):
r0 = 4.a0 + a4 + 2.a8 + 2.ac = · · · = x3[a2c + a28 + a14 + a30] + x2.[a10 + a40 + a24 + a38 +
a3c] + x.[a10 + a20 + a34 + a18 + a48 + a1c + a4c] + 1.[a20 + a44 + a1c + a18].
One can derive the formulae for the column signatures of the MixColumnsSerial by
modulo-2 adding those for each column, e.g., the first column for r0, r4, r8, and rc, whose
details are not presented for the sake of brevity. Adding modulo-2 the first column of
matrix M , one can derive the following signature: r0⊕ r4⊕ r8⊕ rc = (4⊕ 8⊕B⊕ 2).a0 +
(1⊕ 6⊕E ⊕ 2).a4 + (2⊕ 5⊕A⊕ F ).a8 + (2⊕ 6⊕ 9⊕B).ac = 5.a0 + B.a4 + 2.a8 + 6.ac.
This can be generalized to other columns and thus we have the followings for the
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Figure 3.1: The proposed fault diagnosis scheme for the LED block cipher.
second to fourth columns: r1⊕ r5⊕ r9⊕ rd = 5.a1 + B.a5 + 2.a9 + 6.ad, r2⊕ r6⊕ ra⊕ re =
5.a2 + B.a6 + 2.aa + 6.ae, r3 ⊕ r7 ⊕ rb ⊕ rf = 5.a3 + B.a7 + 2.ab + 6.af .
As seen in Fig. 3.1, we have denoted the four operations in LED by the fault di-
agnosis mechanisms for different sub-blocks. As seen in this figure, the AddConstants
parity derivation is cost-free in hardware and that of ShiftRow follows the same details.
One can use the derivations for SubCells operations in Table 3.1 as well as those for
MixColumnsSerial. The overall error detection architecture is composed of the predicted
and actual signatures and their comparisons to derive the error indication flags. In more
details, the derived predicted signatures of these four operations are compared (XORed)
with the corresponding, actual ones to get the error indication flags (which can be ORed
to derive one flag). Based on the reliability requirements and performance and imple-
mentation metrics overhead tolerance, one can tailor the proposed approaches.
3.3 Error Detection for HIGHT Block Cipher
In this chapter, we first present the error detection schemes for the “Initial/Final Trans-
formations and Round Function” through Two Pair Two Rail Checker (TPTRC). Then,
an alternate method based on recomputation is presented. The TPTRC scheme, inher-
ently, is able to detect both transient and permanent faults. Transient single stuck-at
faults are among the ideal cases for fault attackers; however, in practice, multiple (and
adjacent) faults occur. These are detected using the presented scheme and more details
are presented in the next chapter. The signature-based diagnosis approach, which uses
linear codes that can (always) detect random errors of small multiplicity (and can never
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detect some other errors); is diverse from an architecture based on robust codes which
can detect (with probability) any error. We also go over an alternate approach based
on recomputation with encoded operands which has lower area complexity and power
consumption, at the expense of lower performance. The choice among these two schemes
depends on the overhead tolerance for specific applications. The latter scheme, similar
to the former one, detects both transient and permanent faults. We note that perma-
nent faults need to be detected as they might occur through VLSI defects; however, the
attackers are not interested to mount the attacks through such damaging faults.
3.3.1 Initial/Final Transformations and Round Function
The 64-bit plaintext is given as the input to the initial transformation function. It uses
the plaintext and Whitening Keys WK3, WK2, WK1, WK0 as its input and generates the
output as intermediate values X0 = X0,0..X0,6, X0,7 for the first round. The Whitening
Keys WK3, WK2, WK1, WK0 are fed by the Key Scheduling Algorithm. The Initial
Transformation algorithm consists of XOR operations denoted by⊕ and modular addition
represented by ⊞ (note that for decryption, this is replaced by subtraction ⊟).
In the final transformation, the input is the output of the last round X32 and the other
inputs are the Whitening Keys Wk7, WK6, WK5, WK4. The output generated by this
algorithm is the ciphertext, given by C, that is of 64 bits length and it is concatenated
and represented as C0||....C6||C7.
The round function is an iterative process for the 32 rounds and it plays a vital role
in providing enhanced security. The operations carried out in the round function are
modular addition and XOR operation. The input of the round function is the output
of the previous round Xi and the four SubKeys SK4i+3, SK4i+2, SK4i+1, SK4i generated
per each round. The round function algorithm (Algorithm 3.1) generates the 64-bit
output Xi+1 and uses the auxiliary functions F0 and F1 to compute the output Xi =
Xi+1,0||....Xi+1,6||Xi+1,7 concatenation of eight bytes each. The auxiliary functions use
the operation x<<<1 , which is a representation of 1-bit left rotation of the 8-bit value x.
The output of the rotated value is bitwise XORed or modulo-2 added depending on the
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Algorithm 3.1 Round function in the HIGHT block cipher.
RoundFunction(Xi,Xi+1,SK4i+3, SK4i+2,SK4i+1, SK4i) {
Xi+1,1 ← Xi,0; Xi+1,3 ← Xi,2; Xi+1,5 ← Xi,4;
Xi+1,7 ← Xi,6;
Xi+1,0 =Xi,7 ⊕ (F0(Xi,6) ⊞ SK4i+3);
Xi+1,2 =Xi,1 ⊞ (F1(Xi,0)⊕ SK4i+2);
Xi+1,4 =Xi,3 ⊕ (F0(Xi,2) ⊞ SK4i+1);
Xi+1,6 =Xi,5 ⊞ (F1(Xi,4)⊕ SK4i);}
input. The output of the last round is fed to the input of the final transformation. We
note that F0(x) = x<<<1 ⊕ x<<<2 ⊕ x<<<7 and F1(x) = x<<<3 ⊕ x<<<4 ⊕ x<<<6.
For modular addition operation, we choose self-checking carry select adder because
they are fast and have relatively low complexity (for detecting both permanent and
transient stuck-at faults). Generally, it is well known that carry select adders contain two
ripple carry adders and multiplexers. In addition to that hardware resource, as shown
in the Fig. 3.2, this self-checking carry select adder uses XNOR gates and TPTRC as
an additional hardware resource to detect any single stuck at fault [33]. As seen in Fig.
3.2, the size of the adder is arbitrary up to n-bits. Here, for our addition operation, the
operands are of 64 bits size and, hence, we use 64-bit adder to perform the operations.
The adder consists of cascaded ripple carry adders that can add up to two bits at a time
and then the value of the carry out is rippled through a multiplexer. This carry out acts
as the value of the actual carry-in to the next set of cascaded ripple carry adders. The
carry select adder pre-computes the values of the sum bits before knowing the value of
the actual carry-in. Once the value of the actual carry-in is known, the appropriate sum
bits and carry-out of the carry select adder is given as the output by the carry select
adder.
Self-checking multiplexers and TPTRC are used in the proposed architectures. The
TPTRC has two pairs of inputs (x0, y0) and (x1, y1). In the fault-free condition, the input
pairs to the TPTRC are complementary to each other, i.e., x0 = y′0 and x1 = y′1. If there
is no fault, then the output pair of the TPTRC are also complementary to each other,
i.e., t = t′0. Finally, the output pair of TPTRC are given to the XNOR gate and if there
is a fault, the error indication flag is raised to high. The valid input code words for the
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TPTRC are 10 and 01. In case of a single stuck at fault in any one of the internal path of
the ripple carry adder, the input pairs to the TPTRC will be 11 and 00. This will result
in a non-valid output and error indication flag is raised. Such an adder can be used to
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Figure 3.2: Error detection in HIGHT through self-checking carry select adder.
A variant of n-bit model of the self-checking carry select adder based on dual rail
encoding has been proposed in [34]. This variant adder includes an additional circuitry
of AND gates in addition to the hardware used in Fig. 3.2 To compute the sum bits
for the n-bit adder in a dual rail form with valid codewords (10 and 01), AND gates are
used in Fig. 3.2. If S0n is the sum bit computed by the full adder for carry-in of “0” and
S1n is the sum bit computed by full adder for carry-in of “1”, then XNOR operation is
performed between sum-bit S0n and all the lower sum-bits. The output of XNOR gate
is fed to x0 in the TPTRC input pair (x0,y0), and y0 is connected to S1n. Similarly, the
other input pair (x1,y1) to TPTRC is connected in such a way that x1 is connected from
the output of XNOR gate and S0n−1. The sum bit S0n−1 is computed by the full adder for
n−1 inputs with a carry-in of “0”. The sum bit S1n−1 is connected to y1 of TPTRC. The
input pairs are in dual-rail form, that is, the input pairs will be always complementary
to the TPTRC, i.e., x0 =y′0 and x1 =y′1.
Finally, as seen in Fig. 3.3, we have shown the fault diagnosis of the round function of
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Figure 3.3: Error detection for the round function sub-block for HIGHT.
HIGHT. As seen in this figure, for the auxiliary functions F0 and F1 within round function
to compute the output Xi = Xi+1,0||....Xi+1,6||Xi+1,7, we use signature-based schemes to
derive the error indication flags. In more details, the derived predicted signatures of the
operations are compared (XORed) with the corresponding, actual ones to get the error
indication flags (which can be ORed to derive one flag). Specifically, for the modular
addition, the presented TPTRC approach is utilized (see Fig. 3.3); furthermore, for the
auxiliary functions F0 and F1, we use signature-based schemes. Thus, for the modular
addition operation, the proposed scheme based on Fig. 3.3 is utilized. Finally, Fig. 3.4
presents the entire error detection approach for the encryption of HIGHT.
3.3.2 Alternate Approach: Recomputing with Encoded Operands
Concurrent error detection can be performed through recomputing with encoded operands
in such a way that the operations are computed twice, one for the normal operands and
one for the encoded operands. If an n-bit operand is encoded, e.g., rotated left or right
by k bits during the recomputation step, no bit is lost and the scheme utilizes the sizes
of adders, ALUs, and registers increased only by 1 bit. Such an alternate approach,
similar to the previous one, detects both transient and permanent faults in the HIGHT
block cipher. Using such a recomputation, one can efficiently detect k mod n consecutive
logical errors and k mod((n + 1)−1) in arithmetic operations, where n is the length of
arithmetic operations and k bits is the number of bits to be rotated. We have employed
such an approach for the HIGHT block cipher. As the operations involved in the HIGHT
block cipher are addition mod GF (28) and XOR, such an alternate scheme is efficiently
3.3 Error Detection for HIGHT Block Cipher 25
































Figure 3.4: Error detection for the entire encryption of HIGHT block cipher.
Let ϕ and ϕ′ be the n-bit rotation and “back-rotation” functions, respectively. Let θ
be the input to the arithmetic function f , such that f(θ) is the output of the arithmetic
function. The aim is to satisfy ϕ′(f(ϕ(θ)) = f(θ). The operands in the HIGHT block
cipher are run twice. For the first run, the original operands are passed and the result
is computed and stored in a register. For the second run, rotated operands (right or left
cyclic shift) are computed and the result is compared with the first result that is stored
in a register. If there is not a match, then error is detected. For addition operations, to
ensure the correctness of the carry-in for k + 1th bit and carry out from n− 1th bit, we
add an extra bit to the most significant bit (*) position using an n + 1 adder. This bit
is always set to “0” (or stuck at zero). Thus, as a result of rotation, the logic n− 1th bit
does not interfere with the logic 0th bit in the rotated position as well as in the normal
position. During normal computation, the most significant bit is 0; however, during the
recomputation step, the most significant bit is the ith bit. Because the most significant
bit is always stuck at zero, during recomputation, the carry-out from the ith bit is given
to the carry-in of the i + 1th bit. In normal computation, as the value of the carry-out
is always 0, it does not change the ith bit.
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In what follows, we use the case study of SILC to show how the proposed approaches
can be utilized; nevertheless, this does not confine the presented schemes. SILC has a
fixed block length n and uses a block cipher E such that κE × {0, 1}n→{0, 1}n . We
note that HIGHT and LED can both be used for such a construction. SILC comprises
of two algorithms for encryption (SILC-εK) and decryption (SILC-DK). The encryption
SILC-εK algorithm consists of three subroutines HASH, ENC, and PRF. The subroutines
are called in a sequential manner, i.e., the output of one subroutine is fed to the input
of the successive subroutine. The decryption comprises of the same subroutines as the
encryption algorithm, except that an additional comparison between the tag computed
in the decryption algorithm and encryption algorithm is performed. The first step in the
decryption algorithm is the computation of V (which is the result of hashing the inputs
through the key). The next step is the computation of MAC in the decryption algorithm
T ∗(which is the PRF, using the key, of the hash result and the ciphertext). The third step
is the comparison of the tags, and if they do not match, the algorithm returns the result
⊥, meaning that the authentication is failed. The final step in the decryption algorithm
is retrieving the original plaintext M .
3.3.3 Key Schedule
The key schedule for HIGHT comprises of two algorithms: Whitening Key Generation
and SubKeys Generation. The main idea behind the key schedule algorithm is to pre-
serve the master key. Whitening Key Generation algorithm is a subroutine that gener-
ates the eight whitening keys necessary for the Initial/Final Transformations. The Sub-
Key Generation subroutine generates 128 SubKeys and supplies four SubKeys per each
round. For Round 1, four SubKeys SK3, SK2, SK1, SK0 and for round 32, the SubKeys
SK127, SK126, SK125, SK124 are generated by this subroutine. For SubKeys Generation
algorithm, the generation of 128 7-bit constants from δ0 to δ127 is done by the constant
generation module. All the operations are carried out over GF (28) governed by the “con-
nection” polynomial x7 + x3 + 1. The hardware used for the constant generation is an
LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register). The initial state of the 7-bit LFSR ′h′ is fixed
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at (1011010)2.
Fault diagnosis of Whitening Key Generation is straightforward as it is rewiring in
hardware, e.g., one can use signature-based schemes to have low-complexity error detec-
tion. For SubKeys Generation and its internal constant generation module, other that
logic operations, modular addition is utilized whose fault diagnosis has been discussed in
this chapter (through Fig. 3.3).
One can use the proposed algorithms in this thesis to derive the error indication
flags of the underlying block ciphers in SILC. Let us consider two scenarios: If the error
indication flags are raised, an incorrect ciphertext and tag is expected. In this case, not
only the derived tag in decryption would be faulty, but a faulty ciphertext is transmitted
to the receiver side. However, the tags match as authentication is not compromised (same
ciphertext is used to derive both tags). In the second scenario, let the HASH or PRF
functions are faulty, in which case the tags at the receiver side do not match and the
algorithm returns the result ⊥. In both cases, the error indication flags correctly alarm
an incorrect ciphertext.
The work in [35, 36] presents differential fault analysis (DFA) attacks on HIGHT
and LED. The authors used data leaked through random byte model (covered in our
simulations for HIGHT) or random bit (for LED) to deduce the secret key (transient fault
simulations are also presented in the next chapter). For instance, the sketch for attacking
HIGHT includes three phases: (a) collection of right ciphertext and faulty ciphertexts,
(b) the computation of the candidates of subkeys in select rounds and whitening key in
the final transformation, and (c) the recovery of the 128-bit secret key from the candidates
of subkeys and whitening key. If such attacks are successful by bypassing, for instance,
the RERO scheme, we make a small architectural addition to our proposed scheme in
order to detect such type of DFA attacks. Since the fault injections are made at the
input of a round, we compare the input sub-cipher in each round (starting from second
round) with that generated in previous round. Any discrepancies will be indicated by
the error indication flag. Should the attacker try to inject faults in the sub-cipher in the
previous round itself, the previously proposed RERO scheme will detect such an attack.
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Thus, the RERO and the suggested addition should be able to protect the ciphers against
permanent and transient faults and make the DFA attacks more difficult; however, we do
not claim that it will be able to detect all types of DFA attacks, for instance, [37, 38].
Chapter 4
Error Simulations
In this chapter, we present the error simulations and FPGA implementations for LED
and HIGHT block ciphers to benchmark their effectiveness.
To benchmark the effectiveness of the proposed schemes for both ciphers, we utilize
LFSRs to inject stuck-at faults. The purpose of using LFSRs is to generate pseudo-
random fault patterns for every clock cycle. The outputs of the LFSRs are XORed with
a random bit and sent as the feedback to the input. In this way, random single and
multiple stuck-at faults are injected in the design. We use the polynomial x6 + x3 + 1 for
the implementation of the LFSRs. The LFSRs are used to inject 10,000 faults in LED
block cipher and the fault coverage is found to be very close to 100% from the simulation
results. In HIGHT and for recomputing with encoded operands approach, we have used
the LFSRs with the same polynomials to inject the faults. In the first run, the actual
operands are sent for computation of the output. In the second run, the operands that
are rotated to the right are used to compute the output. In the third run, the output
from the last round is rotated left and then compared with the output from the first run.
If they do not match, then error indication flags are raised. The modular adders used in
the round function module are also injected with single and multiple faults. By the use of
LFSRs, around 10,000 single and multiple faults are injected in the HIGHT architecture,
where, the results from the simulations for the overall structure shows a very high fault
coverage of close to 100%.
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The proposed methods, being for reliability, can deal with permanent and tran-
sient faults. To make sure we cover a good number of fault models, through injecting
10,000 faults in the architecture of HIGHT, we have also investigated transient faults,
one/two/three-bit faults, byte faults, and two-byte adjacent faults. The simulations have
been performed separately and the results show that (a) for transient faults, we have
9,989 detected faults leading to the error coverage of around 99.9%, (b) for one-bit faults,
we have 9,854 detected faults leading to the error coverage of around 98.5%, (c) for two-
bit faults, we have 9,890 detected faults leading to the error coverage of 98.9%, (d) for
three-bit faults, we have 9,988 detected faults leading to the error coverage of around
99.9%, (e) for one-byte faults, we have 9,976 detected faults leading to the error coverage
of around 99.8%, and finally, (f) for two-byte faults, we have 9,980 detected faults lead-
ing to the error coverage of 99.8%. We note that although these figures are very high,
tailoring the proposed error detection schemes, one may achieve higher error coverage if




In this chapter, we present the area, power consumption, and delay overhead results for
LED and HIGHT block ciphers through the FPGA implementations. The benchmarking
is done for both the original and fault detection architectures of LED and HIGHT block
ciphers. The FPGA implementations are carried out on Xilinx family Virtex-7 with target
device 7vx330tffg1157-3.
The error detection schemes for LED are shown as LED-signature in Table 5.1. The
area in terms of number of slices, delay, and power consumptions are derived for Virtex-7
by implementing the design at 100 MHz frequency. The overheads of the error detection
architectures are shown in the parentheses in this table (using Xilinx Integrated Synthesis
Environment (ISE) 14.7 version).
The results from the FPGA implementations of HIGHT-original and fault detection
are shown in Table 5.2. The area overhead for the fault detection design is due to the
inclusion of error detecting adders used for the recomputed operation. From the results,
we can infer that there are negligible power and delay overheads for the architecture as
Table 5.1: FPGA implementations of LED on Virtex-7 (target device: 7vx330tffg1157-3).
Architecture Area (slices) Delay (ns) Power (mW )
LED-original 178 5.841 2.93
LED-signature 217 (21.9%) 5.914 (1.2%) 3.67 (25.2%)
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Table 5.2: FPGA implementations of HIGHT on Virtex-7 (target device: 7vx330tffg1157-
3).
Architecture Area (slices) Delay (ns) Power (mW )
HIGHT-original 191 2.686 2.15
HIGHT-proposed 252 (31.9%) ∼2.686 2.17 (0.01%)
well as acceptable area overhead (we note that such overheads can be adjusted based
on the objectives, for instance, avoiding sub-pipelining could be a compromise between
area/power and throughput).
The throughput degradations are also derived for the original and fault detection
architectures. For the signature-based schemes, the throughput degradation is negligible,
i.e., for LED we have 342.407 Mbps for the original and 338.180 Mbps for the fault
detection structures leading to the degradation of 1.23. For the HIGHT algorithm, one
can perform sub-pipelining to account for the inherent reduction in throughput. Utilizing
one-stage sub-pipelining, at the cost of registers added, similar throughput to the original
architecture is derived.
There has not been any prior work done on error detection methods for these ciphers
to the best of our knowledge. In [39], the authors present fault diagnosis of Pomaranch
cipher. They have used bit-interleaved scheme for error detection. We compare the
overheads of Pomaranch with the proposed scheme. The combined area and throughput
overhead for Pomaranch is 35.5%. The proposed schemes have combined area and delay
overheads of 23% for LED and 31.9% for HIGHT, respectively. Since the architecture
of Pomaranch and presented fault detection scheme is a lot different than the proposed
method, the differences in the overheads are reasonably justified.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Our research group has extensive experience in cryptographic engineering and fault diag-
nosis as well as editing IEEE Transactions journals [45-95]. In this thesis, signature-based
and recomputing with encoded operand-based approaches are presented for the LED and
HIGHT block ciphers. Formulae for the linear and non-linear sub-blocks of the LED
block cipher are presented, tailoring which one can achieve the required reliability and
overheads. We have also applied sub-pipelining to overcome the inherent throughput
degradation of the proposed approaches for the HIGHT block cipher [90-92]. Such SPN-
based and Feistel network-based block ciphers can be used as part of the authenticated
encryption mechanisms such as SILC. Through fault-injection analysis, it has been shown
that the error coverage is close to 100%. Moreover, through FPGA implementations, we
have shown that acceptable overheads are achieved for both ciphers. Based on the relia-
bility requirements and available resources, one may utilize the proposed error detection
schemes for making the hardware implementations of LED and HIGHT algorithms more
reliable.
6.1 Future Work
The proposed work is about the error detection of permanent and transient faults in LED
and HIGHT block ciphers for the SILC. The time redundancy approach uses RERO for
detecting the faults. However, the future work can be done using REPO, which is one
6.1 Future Work 34
of the types that expliots time redundancy method. The efficiency of the fault detection
architectures such as REPO can be also be tested using fault injection simulation schemes
such as BIST. The future work can be done by implementing the cipher designs in ASIC
platforms to see if the fault tolerant architectures can be suitable for low area or low
power applications. The work can be further considered to test for transition faults (slow
rise (0 to 1) and slow fall (1 to 0) faults) and bridging faults.
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